http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/The-end-of-shadow-banking-$pd20090327-QHSUJ?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13394576&source=features_box_main
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/26/news/geithner.house.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009032611
Hmmm...oversight. Pretty much every type of investment operation has to report to the authorities, and if it is decided that it is too leveraged or systemically important, it would get referred to some new "systemic risk" entity.
Which begs the question: would this new entity be any better at using the information it gets than the authorities were over the past few years? It's not like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers or the other banks weren't being quite open with the regulators about what they were doing.
And we're seeing a move towards centralised clearing for OTC derivatives. I can't think of a better way to do it, but I'm worried about a potential reduction in flexibility. Maybe it'll come down to the OTCs being replaced with collections of simpler, centrally cleared or even exchange-traded instruments.
Watch this space. Closely.
Sunday 29 March 2009
Wednesday 25 March 2009
Another rescue plan, another disappointment
Looks like I didn't post anything for a while. I suppose I'm busy...
Anyways, interesting stuff that happened:
A loop hole in the design of the bail-out to AIG, left in there because Treasury was worried about legal challenges, allowed AIG executives to take $165 million in bonuses. That has, conveniently?, given politicians in the US Congress the opportunity to jump on a "those greedy bastards" band wagon and pass a retroactive (IIRC) 90% tax rate on bonuses paid out in all institutions that received taxpayer funds. While I agree with the intention, I'm not so convinced about the means chosen to do so. I understand that this was the legally easiest way of doing it, but it does nothing for the underlying moral justification for forcing people to pay tax in the first place...
Of some personal interest to me has the decision by the Fed to finally go ahead with the direct purchase of long-term US treasuries. In order to buy the things, the Fed is printing money. So the policy has two effects: firstly, it injects more freshly printed cash into the economy (hopefully stopping the onset of deflation) and it pushes up prices of long-term US bonds and therefore pushes down real long-term interest rates (hopefully circumventing the problems in the transmission mechanism we're seeing at the moment). I think they've waited quite long to get this tool out of the box, but I agree with its deployment. The risk for the real US economy for the foreseeable future is a drawn-out deleveraging process that with it brings sustained price falls. That has to be prevented, pretty much whatever the cost.
Nevermind though, because the real news has been the final (for now) design of the banking rescue. The idea is as follows:
- Bad Assets on bank balance sheets have to be removed from there, which means someone has to buy them off the banks. But no one wants to have them, so there are no buyers and therefore no market that could tell us an appropriate price.
- A few months ago, in TARP MkI, Hank Paulson found that coming up with a price was a lot harder than he thought. While he and his team tried to figure out how to do it, the environment got a lot worse, and he switched ideas towards an equity injection strategy instead (which was subsequently bungled as well).
- So now Tim Geithner is back to the same idea, but rather than coming up with their own prices, they think they can create an "artificial" market to value the assets. Essentially, they are going to throw $100 billion into a pot and are asking private investors (such as hedge funds and distressed debt funds) to join in. They will then hold an auction, and so hopefully these private investors, subsidised with taxpayer funds, will go ahead and buy the assets.
- They then hope that everyone makes some money: the banks are relieved, and if the assets come back in value, the private investors (and their tax-paying backers) get to buy cheap and sell for much more.
That last one, in my opinion, is pure optimism. They're still treating this collapse in the value of assets (namely complex financial instruments ultimately backed by mortgages, but even physical assets, like US real estate) as something temporary. They seem to think that once confidence returns to normal, everything will be fine. And in that sense, the entire crisis right now is just a case of market failure, a temporary panic that will soon go away. Maybe someone's been spending too much time reading the final chapter of Keynes' "General Theory", I don't know. But it just screams naivety to me.
I'm going to put it out there that maybe the market isn't wrong now, but was wrong previously. Maybe these assets were so ridiculously overvalued that they will never come back to anything like the price banks paid for them. Maybe for some there just won't be anything like a liquid market ever. And if that is the case, these private investors are using the taxpayer subsidies to shift the problems from banks to their own balance sheets. That has the advantage of getting banks lending again (given some condition, see below), but means that now there are big private and institutional investors that end up with bad debts. Are we going to see the taxpayer being required to backstop those too? Indeed, will we see markets that shouldn't exist being kept alive artificially for the rest of time, by continuing use of taxpayer money?
As for that aforementioned condition, there is still the big problem Paulson faced months ago: The fair price of these assets is very low. But if the banks only receive a fair price for them, they are insolvent and by all rights bankrupt. The banks have to get a much higher price for them than their likely actual worth. So as part of the auction, things must be structured in such a way as to push up the bidding beyond a certain point - in effect either the subsidies must be so big as to shift all the upwards to some point (determined by who - by the banks?), or the auction process has to be designed to distinctly disadvantage the bidders. Hmm...I'm not sure I'd want to be in there.
And in other, rather less well-publicised news, apparently the US Treasury has taken the securities the Fed took on during its rescue of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan onto its own balance sheet. In effect, the US taxpayer has been burdened with another few billion dollars worth of potentially dodgy securities, quietly and under the cover of the bigger news. Wiki says that portfolio was down $2 billion in November '08 and I'd encourage people to find out where it's at now. Anyways, that wasn't exactly part of the plan as it had been explained to the public at the time...but I suppose the cynics out there always saw it coming, right?
Makes me kind of glad I pay my taxes here, as much as I disagree with them at times. :P
Anyways, interesting stuff that happened:
A loop hole in the design of the bail-out to AIG, left in there because Treasury was worried about legal challenges, allowed AIG executives to take $165 million in bonuses. That has, conveniently?, given politicians in the US Congress the opportunity to jump on a "those greedy bastards" band wagon and pass a retroactive (IIRC) 90% tax rate on bonuses paid out in all institutions that received taxpayer funds. While I agree with the intention, I'm not so convinced about the means chosen to do so. I understand that this was the legally easiest way of doing it, but it does nothing for the underlying moral justification for forcing people to pay tax in the first place...
Of some personal interest to me has the decision by the Fed to finally go ahead with the direct purchase of long-term US treasuries. In order to buy the things, the Fed is printing money. So the policy has two effects: firstly, it injects more freshly printed cash into the economy (hopefully stopping the onset of deflation) and it pushes up prices of long-term US bonds and therefore pushes down real long-term interest rates (hopefully circumventing the problems in the transmission mechanism we're seeing at the moment). I think they've waited quite long to get this tool out of the box, but I agree with its deployment. The risk for the real US economy for the foreseeable future is a drawn-out deleveraging process that with it brings sustained price falls. That has to be prevented, pretty much whatever the cost.
Nevermind though, because the real news has been the final (for now) design of the banking rescue. The idea is as follows:
- Bad Assets on bank balance sheets have to be removed from there, which means someone has to buy them off the banks. But no one wants to have them, so there are no buyers and therefore no market that could tell us an appropriate price.
- A few months ago, in TARP MkI, Hank Paulson found that coming up with a price was a lot harder than he thought. While he and his team tried to figure out how to do it, the environment got a lot worse, and he switched ideas towards an equity injection strategy instead (which was subsequently bungled as well).
- So now Tim Geithner is back to the same idea, but rather than coming up with their own prices, they think they can create an "artificial" market to value the assets. Essentially, they are going to throw $100 billion into a pot and are asking private investors (such as hedge funds and distressed debt funds) to join in. They will then hold an auction, and so hopefully these private investors, subsidised with taxpayer funds, will go ahead and buy the assets.
- They then hope that everyone makes some money: the banks are relieved, and if the assets come back in value, the private investors (and their tax-paying backers) get to buy cheap and sell for much more.
That last one, in my opinion, is pure optimism. They're still treating this collapse in the value of assets (namely complex financial instruments ultimately backed by mortgages, but even physical assets, like US real estate) as something temporary. They seem to think that once confidence returns to normal, everything will be fine. And in that sense, the entire crisis right now is just a case of market failure, a temporary panic that will soon go away. Maybe someone's been spending too much time reading the final chapter of Keynes' "General Theory", I don't know. But it just screams naivety to me.
I'm going to put it out there that maybe the market isn't wrong now, but was wrong previously. Maybe these assets were so ridiculously overvalued that they will never come back to anything like the price banks paid for them. Maybe for some there just won't be anything like a liquid market ever. And if that is the case, these private investors are using the taxpayer subsidies to shift the problems from banks to their own balance sheets. That has the advantage of getting banks lending again (given some condition, see below), but means that now there are big private and institutional investors that end up with bad debts. Are we going to see the taxpayer being required to backstop those too? Indeed, will we see markets that shouldn't exist being kept alive artificially for the rest of time, by continuing use of taxpayer money?
As for that aforementioned condition, there is still the big problem Paulson faced months ago: The fair price of these assets is very low. But if the banks only receive a fair price for them, they are insolvent and by all rights bankrupt. The banks have to get a much higher price for them than their likely actual worth. So as part of the auction, things must be structured in such a way as to push up the bidding beyond a certain point - in effect either the subsidies must be so big as to shift all the upwards to some point (determined by who - by the banks?), or the auction process has to be designed to distinctly disadvantage the bidders. Hmm...I'm not sure I'd want to be in there.
And in other, rather less well-publicised news, apparently the US Treasury has taken the securities the Fed took on during its rescue of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan onto its own balance sheet. In effect, the US taxpayer has been burdened with another few billion dollars worth of potentially dodgy securities, quietly and under the cover of the bigger news. Wiki says that portfolio was down $2 billion in November '08 and I'd encourage people to find out where it's at now. Anyways, that wasn't exactly part of the plan as it had been explained to the public at the time...but I suppose the cynics out there always saw it coming, right?
Makes me kind of glad I pay my taxes here, as much as I disagree with them at times. :P
Sunday 8 March 2009
Myron Scholes, intellectual godfather of the credit default swap, says blow 'em all up
http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2009/03/06/myron-scholes-intellectual-godfather-of-the-credit-default-swap-says-blow-em-all-up/
Myron Scholes, whose Black-Scholes option pricing model provided the intellectual underpinning for modern derivatives markets, thinks one particular derivatives market—that for credit default swaps—is due for a Red Adair style rescue. Or a Fred Adair style rescue.
Red Adair put out oil well fires by setting off gigantic explosions at the wellhead. "My belief is that the Fred Adair solution is to blow up or burn the OTC market in credit default swaps," Scholes said this morning. What that means, he elaborated, is that regulators should "try to close all contracts at mid-market prices" and then start up the market anew with clearer rules and shorter-duration contracts.
Hmm, there we go. I'm not sure his work on options pricing really makes him an expert on CDS contracts, but he still knows a lot more than I do.Saturday 7 March 2009
"Does anyone really want to see Citi's first-quarter numbers?"
From KAL at The Economist: http://www.economist.com/daily/kallery/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13245050&source=features_box_main
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/economy/jobs_february/index.htm
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/companies/bank_failure/index.htm
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/dodd.fdic.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009030700
In the US the unemployment rate hit 8.1%, another bank bit the dust and in the CDS markets one seizure after the other rocks the system. The markets are, under the cover of darkness at times, preparing for some more big-name defaults.
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/economy/consumer_credit/index.htm
In a bit of a happy blip, US consumer credit had a bit of a spike, which is nice. But it's unlikely to have anything to do with the bigger picture.
http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13244969&source=features_box_main
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Big-risks-for-the-insurer-of-last-resort-$pd20090306-PUS82?OpenDocument
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13240654
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145857
http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2009/03/wheres-the-trade.html
I've also found a couple of articles about the situation in Europe and the UK. The government there just increased its stake in Lloyd's Bank (not related to the insurance company, by the way), but there is little for them to do but sit back and pick up the pieces as they come. Britain is in really, really deep trouble and Roger Ehrenberg from informationarbitrage sets out a few reasons for why long-US/short-UK might be an idea for the next year. I'm still astounded myself that US treasuries has held up, but I suppose there's basically nothing else out there to put one's money into.
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/KGB-INTERROGATION-Greg-Tanzer-$pd20090306-PURW6?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13251429&source=features_box_main
And of course the regulators are out there as well, as usual trying to hide their inability to see any of this coming with "we didn't have enough power". Stupid, if you ask me because even without the legislations to do anything they had all the access to information they could possibly have needed. But they had no better an idea on the true state of the system than the banks themselves. There's some sort of debate popping up at the moment in Australia as well. Domestic banks here are doing relatively well, and politicans are quick to attribute this to APRA and all the great regulations they devised, while CEOs of course attribute most of it to their great leadership and risk management systems. But Ian MacFarlane (former RBA boss) reckons it might have had different reasons: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Foundational-fluke-$pd20090302-PR559?OpenDocument
And in funny/general news, it turns out that
- About $50b of US taxpayer funds used to save AIG went straight into the pockets of Deutsche and Goldman's, among others: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123638394500958141.html
- People are remembering some wisdom from ages past by buying a good book: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13185404
- New York is basically stuffed: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/new-york-$pd20090306-PUQMU?OpenDocument ... reading that, I can't help myself: http://www.leveragedsellout.com/2008/05/layoff-season
- And finally, here's a bit of an overview of the one question that really needs answering yesterday: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/To-nationalise-or-not--that-is-the-question-$pd20090304-PSUBW?OpenDocument
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/economy/jobs_february/index.htm
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/companies/bank_failure/index.htm
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/dodd.fdic.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009030700
In the US the unemployment rate hit 8.1%, another bank bit the dust and in the CDS markets one seizure after the other rocks the system. The markets are, under the cover of darkness at times, preparing for some more big-name defaults.
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/economy/consumer_credit/index.htm
In a bit of a happy blip, US consumer credit had a bit of a spike, which is nice. But it's unlikely to have anything to do with the bigger picture.
http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13244969&source=features_box_main
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Big-risks-for-the-insurer-of-last-resort-$pd20090306-PUS82?OpenDocument
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13240654
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145857
http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2009/03/wheres-the-trade.html
I've also found a couple of articles about the situation in Europe and the UK. The government there just increased its stake in Lloyd's Bank (not related to the insurance company, by the way), but there is little for them to do but sit back and pick up the pieces as they come. Britain is in really, really deep trouble and Roger Ehrenberg from informationarbitrage sets out a few reasons for why long-US/short-UK might be an idea for the next year. I'm still astounded myself that US treasuries has held up, but I suppose there's basically nothing else out there to put one's money into.
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/KGB-INTERROGATION-Greg-Tanzer-$pd20090306-PURW6?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13251429&source=features_box_main
And of course the regulators are out there as well, as usual trying to hide their inability to see any of this coming with "we didn't have enough power". Stupid, if you ask me because even without the legislations to do anything they had all the access to information they could possibly have needed. But they had no better an idea on the true state of the system than the banks themselves. There's some sort of debate popping up at the moment in Australia as well. Domestic banks here are doing relatively well, and politicans are quick to attribute this to APRA and all the great regulations they devised, while CEOs of course attribute most of it to their great leadership and risk management systems. But Ian MacFarlane (former RBA boss) reckons it might have had different reasons: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Foundational-fluke-$pd20090302-PR559?OpenDocument
And in funny/general news, it turns out that
- About $50b of US taxpayer funds used to save AIG went straight into the pockets of Deutsche and Goldman's, among others: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123638394500958141.html
- People are remembering some wisdom from ages past by buying a good book: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13185404
- New York is basically stuffed: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/new-york-$pd20090306-PUQMU?OpenDocument ... reading that, I can't help myself: http://www.leveragedsellout.com/2008/05/layoff-season
- And finally, here's a bit of an overview of the one question that really needs answering yesterday: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/To-nationalise-or-not--that-is-the-question-$pd20090304-PSUBW?OpenDocument
Wednesday 4 March 2009
RBA, AIG and GSEs
Well, a few pieces of news over the past few days. The RBA decided to wait and see for how things will turn out. I'd actually thought they would cut by 25bps, but I suppose it's not a big difference. The idea is that so far in recent weeks the data that came out wasn't all that bad - no collapse in house prices and unemployment stayed low. Today our GDP figures are due to come out, but expectations are that they're about flat or maybe slightly positive. Given that interest rate cuts take a little while to feed through the system and actually make an impact in the economy, they figured this was a good time to have a breather and take stock. Which makes sense now, but might look a bit silly a few months from now when unemployment spikes and we're in a recession...I still don't think there's a realistic chance of avoiding at least a short one, given that pretty much all our trading partners are there already.
Anyways, here's some news and opinion on it:
http://www.rba.gov.au/MediaReleases/2009/mr_09_05.html
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/A-small-sigh-of-relief-$pd20090303-PS6MH?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/The-RBAs-wait-and-see-approach-$pd20090303-PS7EE?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Back-after-these-messages-$pd20090303-PS7SL?OpenDocument&src=sph
The other news came from AIG in the US. After being saved from complete collapse shortly after Lehman's death, they've been suffering. In fact, if you look at the numbers, in 2008 AIG lost an average of US$27.9 million an hour. That's impressive no matter which way you turn it. Here's a bit of background: AIG is a normal insurance company, one of the world's largest (maybe the largest, actually) and supposedly quite safe. Unfortunately, they thought they had things worked out in financial markets, and got into insuring bonds against default. From there it was only a small step to writing CDS (Credit Default Swap) contracts. The idea is that you write and sell the CDS to someone, that someone pays you a percentage of the face value every so often, and in case some third party defaults, you have to pay this someone some sum of money. So it is essentially an insurance against default, to be bought by someone who would lose if this third party couldn't pay its bills. Good idea in principle, but as most things in this crisis, it was misused.
AIG relied on its own ratings and those of ratings agencies who figured that companies like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie and Freddie, Merrills, GM, Ford etc etc would never ever go bankrupt. So they wrote lots of CDS contracts on those firms, which were then put through the process of financial engineering that made things more complicated: SIVs, CDOs, CDO-squareds and all the rest of them.
Essentially no one at the top at AIG understood that this one department of the firm (probably just one desk within that one department) was taking on liabilities large enough to destroy the entire company. The strategy paid off big money while everything was okay (all the holders of these CDS were afterall paying their regular fees to AIG, and there were commissions to be made), and then suddenly went horribly wrong when these companies actually started going bust.
So now the US taxpayer has been called to the rescue, and I can understand why Bernanke at least is particularly annoyed with this one. Of all the stories in this crisis (with the exception of Maddoff and the Merrill bonuses, perhaps), this is the least justifiable: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aHx9vZa0IJAo&refer=home
On the other hand, if you don't act like a bunch of idiots, there's still money in this stuff. JPM is coming out of this looking quite good, I have to say: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a96UdT6uCOcA&refer=home
There's also been a little bit of progress on the housing/mortgage rescue of the Obama administration. Here's the plan so far: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg33.htm
Rather than go through all the details myself, I'll just post two excellent articles by Christopher Joyce on the issue. Essentially he argues that the seeds for the mortgage-based part of this crisis are to be found in the structure of the banking industry in the US, which is in turn the result of regulatory restrictions and left-over "emergency" measures and institutions the government created after the Great Depression. Somewhat predictably, the White House in its plan isn't doing anything to address this, but prefers to try to patch up this unsound system and leave it at that. But have a read yourselves, it's a bit long but definitely worth it:
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Joye-$pd20090226-PM69X?OpenDocument
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Barack-Obama--hope-or-hyperbole-$pd20090303-PRT4K?OpenDocument&src=sph
Anyways, here's some news and opinion on it:
http://www.rba.gov.au/MediaReleases/2009/mr_09_05.html
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/A-small-sigh-of-relief-$pd20090303-PS6MH?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/The-RBAs-wait-and-see-approach-$pd20090303-PS7EE?OpenDocument&src=sph
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Back-after-these-messages-$pd20090303-PS7SL?OpenDocument&src=sph
The other news came from AIG in the US. After being saved from complete collapse shortly after Lehman's death, they've been suffering. In fact, if you look at the numbers, in 2008 AIG lost an average of US$27.9 million an hour. That's impressive no matter which way you turn it. Here's a bit of background: AIG is a normal insurance company, one of the world's largest (maybe the largest, actually) and supposedly quite safe. Unfortunately, they thought they had things worked out in financial markets, and got into insuring bonds against default. From there it was only a small step to writing CDS (Credit Default Swap) contracts. The idea is that you write and sell the CDS to someone, that someone pays you a percentage of the face value every so often, and in case some third party defaults, you have to pay this someone some sum of money. So it is essentially an insurance against default, to be bought by someone who would lose if this third party couldn't pay its bills. Good idea in principle, but as most things in this crisis, it was misused.
AIG relied on its own ratings and those of ratings agencies who figured that companies like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie and Freddie, Merrills, GM, Ford etc etc would never ever go bankrupt. So they wrote lots of CDS contracts on those firms, which were then put through the process of financial engineering that made things more complicated: SIVs, CDOs, CDO-squareds and all the rest of them.
Essentially no one at the top at AIG understood that this one department of the firm (probably just one desk within that one department) was taking on liabilities large enough to destroy the entire company. The strategy paid off big money while everything was okay (all the holders of these CDS were afterall paying their regular fees to AIG, and there were commissions to be made), and then suddenly went horribly wrong when these companies actually started going bust.
So now the US taxpayer has been called to the rescue, and I can understand why Bernanke at least is particularly annoyed with this one. Of all the stories in this crisis (with the exception of Maddoff and the Merrill bonuses, perhaps), this is the least justifiable: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aHx9vZa0IJAo&refer=home
On the other hand, if you don't act like a bunch of idiots, there's still money in this stuff. JPM is coming out of this looking quite good, I have to say: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a96UdT6uCOcA&refer=home
There's also been a little bit of progress on the housing/mortgage rescue of the Obama administration. Here's the plan so far: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg33.htm
Rather than go through all the details myself, I'll just post two excellent articles by Christopher Joyce on the issue. Essentially he argues that the seeds for the mortgage-based part of this crisis are to be found in the structure of the banking industry in the US, which is in turn the result of regulatory restrictions and left-over "emergency" measures and institutions the government created after the Great Depression. Somewhat predictably, the White House in its plan isn't doing anything to address this, but prefers to try to patch up this unsound system and leave it at that. But have a read yourselves, it's a bit long but definitely worth it:
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Joye-$pd20090226-PM69X?OpenDocument
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Barack-Obama--hope-or-hyperbole-$pd20090303-PRT4K?OpenDocument&src=sph
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)